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1 Introduction
A young person’s life chances are shaped in large part by the investments in education,
training and career development that he or she makes in early adulthood. These invest-
ments now take substantially longer than they once did and young people are increasingly
turning to their families for help. Today, young adults are less likely to leave their par-
ents’ home at any given age, more likely to receive ﬁnancial support when they do live
apart, and more likely to return home as their circumstances change (e.g. Hartley, 1993;
Schneider, 1999; Marks, 2007).
There is mounting evidence that parental support in the form of co-residence or ﬁnan-
cial transfers can play an important role in ensuring that young people make a successful
transition into adult roles. The option of living with one’s parents allows young people
to consume, save and invest even in the face of credit constraints (e.g. Cox, 1990; Folgi,
2000; Ermisch, 2003a) and to insure themselves against bad labor market outcomes (e.g.
McElroy, 1985; Card and Lemieux, 1997; Kaplan, 2010) or relationship breakdowns (e.g.
Hamon, 1995). Similarly, parents’ ﬁnancial assistance in meeting the costs of education
and training is linked to their adult children enjoying higher living standards primarily
as a result of improved labor market opportunities (e.g. Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein,
2001).
Unfortunately, not all young people will have access to the parental support they
want and/or need. Some families lack the necessary resources, while others may simply
be unwilling to continue supporting children after they reach adulthood. Parents in most
countries are legally obligated to house, feed, cloth, and educate their children until
they reach adulthood; however, there is much less consensus about what should happen
afterwards. Parents’ own views about their ﬁnancial obligations to their adult oﬀspring
are related to the family’s structure, for example, with parents in intact families reporting
more obligation than single parents or parents in stepfamilies (e.g. Aquilino, 2005). As
a result, families can vary substantially in the level and type of support they provide
to their adult children and the circumstances in which they provide it (e.g. Semyonov
and Lewin-Epstein, 2001). This lack of consensus may result in young people having2
unrealistic expectations about the support they can count on. Goldscheider et al. (2001),
for example, ﬁnd that the proportion of mothers’ willing to give support is less than the
proportion of young adults expecting parental support.
Our goal is to extend the current literature by investigating the link between young
adults’ family circumstances and the support they receive from their parents as they make
investments in education and work. We are particularly interested in the following ques-
tions. First, does social and economic disadvantage reduce the support parents provide
to their young-adult children? Second, is a young person’s propensity to be studying
or employed related to the parental support he or she is receiving? Third, do dispari-
ties in parental support explain the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and young
people’s outcomes? In addressing these questions, we focus explicitly on the economic
support provided through direct ﬁnancial transfers as well as through intergenerational
co-residence. We take advantage of data from the Youth in Focus (YIF) Project which
interviewed young adults at age 18 and again at age 20. Among other things, YIF re-
spondents provided detailed information about their living arrangements, the ﬁnancial
support they receive from their parents and their family background (e.g. parents’ educa-
tional attainment, occupation, employment history). These survey data are then merged
to nearly a decade of administrative data on the family’s welfare receipt while the young
person was growing up. A family’s welfare experience is about more than the narrow
receipt of public assistance per se, but also reﬂects the broader family circumstances, i.e.
unemployment, poverty, family breakdown, single parenthood, etc., which led the family
to require social assistance in the ﬁrst place. Thus, the YIF data are unique in allowing
us to link a broad summary measure of social and economic disadvantage in childhood to
the support families are providing to young people and to assess whether young people’s
participation in higher education and the labor market is linked to that support.
We ﬁnd that young people who experience socioeconomic disadvantage are more likely
to be residentially and ﬁnancially independent of their parents than are their peers growing
up in more advantaged circumstances. This disparity is larger for ﬁnancial transfers
than for co-residence and increases as young people age. Moreover, there is a clear link3
between parental support and a young person’s engagement in study and work which is
generally stronger at age 20 than at age 18 and is often stronger for advantaged than
for disadvantaged youths. We ﬁnd no evidence, however, that a lack of parental support
explains the socioeconomic gradient in either studying or employment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of our empirical
strategy. The details of the YIF data, our estimation sample, and key variables are
provided in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our main results, while detailed results can be
found in a short technical appendix. Our conclusions and suggested directions for future
research are discussed in Section 5.
2 The Empirical Strategy
2.1 Theoretical Background
Over the past 20 years or so, parents’ support of their adult children, either through joint
living arrangements or through ﬁnancial transfers, has begun to receive explicit attention
in the international literature.1 Economists have been instrumental in developing theo-
retical models of the family’s decision-making process surrounding alternative forms of
support. In particular, researchers often adopt a noncooperative game theoretic frame-
work when modelling the interaction between parents and their adolescent children (e.g.
McElroy, 1985; Weinberg, 2001; Kooreman, 2004; Hao et al., 2008; Lundberg et al., 2007).
Unlike the cooperative approach taken in understanding bargaining between spouses, ado-
lescents are better seen as economic agents with independent preferences and the power
to inﬂuence family outcomes (e.g. Lundberg et al., 2007).
In this context, co-residence can be seen as a form of inter-familial transfer similar
to other inter vivos transfers.2 Thus, the decision to co-reside rests upon a comparison
of the indirect utility when parents live with their adult children and when they do not.
1Generally, researchers have considered support in the form of ﬁnancial transfers (e.g. Bernheim et al.,
1985; Cox, 1987; Cox and Jakubson, 1995; Guiso and Jappelli, 2002)and co-residence (e.g. Wolf and Soldo,
1989; Ermisch and Di Salvo, 1997) separately. More recent research has also considered the eﬀects of time
transfers, particularly in the form of care for grandchildren, between mothers and their adult daughters
(e.g. Dimova and Wolﬀ, 2010).
2See Cobb-Clark (2008) for a review of the literature surrounding the co-residence decision.4
Parents are usually assumed to have altruistic preferences, and the public-good nature
of housing implies that co-residence is a less expensive way of transferring resources to
children than providing ﬁnancial transfers directly. At the same time, co-residence may
involve additional costs resulting from a lack of privacy and independence (e.g. McElroy,
1985; Ermisch and Di Salvo, 1997; Ermisch, 1999, 2003b; Laferr` ere and Bessi` ere, 2003;
Le Blanc and Wolﬀ, 2006; Laferr` ere, 2006).
Evidence suggests that parental support for young adults is often targeted. U.S. par-
ents, for example, appear to use co-residence and ﬁnancial transfers to subsidize their chil-
dren’s investments in education (e.g. Keane and Wolpin, 2010; Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
1993). Similarly Spanish parents use co-residence as a means of helping their children
w h oa r ee i t h e rs t u d y i n go rd on o th a v eaj o b( e . g . M a r t ´ ınez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo,
2002). The targeted nature of parental support is consistent with parents having pater-
nalistic rather than altruistic preferences (e.g. Pollak, 1988). In other words, parents may
care about their children’s characteristics (i.e. educational attainment) or behavior (i.e.
employment status) rather than their utility or wellbeing per se.
2.2 Empirical Model
We estimate the relationship between parental support and youths’ activities using the
following model. Let S denote the type of support parents provide to the youth, and
let A denote the youth’s educational and employment activity. We assume that S and
A are discrete random variables, with S ∈{ s1,...,s Ks} categories of support and A ∈
{a1,...,a Ka} categories of activities. As explained below we distinguish between families
who experienced no, moderate, or extensive socioeconomic disadvantage while the youth
was growing up. Let G denote the family’s socioeconomic circumstances, with G ∈
{g1,g 2,g 3}. Finally, X represents a vector of other family background characteristics,
lowercase letters denote particular values of random variables, and Greek letters denote
unknown parameter vectors.5
We assume that parental support S conforms to a multinomial logit model,
Pr(S = s|G = g,X = x)=
exp(αs + xβs +˜ gμs)
Ks
j=1exp(αj + xβj +˜ gμj)
, (1)
where ˜ G is a vector of zeros and a single one indicating the category of socioeconomic
circumstances. That is, if G = gj for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 then the jth element of ˜ G is 1 and all
other elements are 0. We also assume a multinomial logit model for the activity A,
Pr(A = a|S = s,G = g,X = x)=
exp(γa + xδa +˜ gπa + ζ
ag˜ s)
Ka
j=1 exp(γj + xδj +˜ gπj + ζ
jg˜ s)
, (2)
where ˜ S is a vector of zeros and a single one indicating the observed support category
for the family. That is, if S = sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ Ks then the jth element of ˜ S is 1 and all
other elements are 0. Note that the coeﬃcients ζag on the support variable are speciﬁc not
only to the activity, but also to the family’s socioeconomic circumstances. That is, the
support variable is interacted with the degree of socioeconomic disadvantage the family
experienced while the youth was growing up.
2.3 Interpretation Issues
The above empirical model allows us to estimate the causal eﬀect of parental support on
young people’s educational and employment activities only if parents “dictate” a support
category without any regard to the youth’s chosen activity. In this case, the support
that parents provide is exogenous to the youth’s decision to study and/or work and the
resulting estimates can be given a causal interpretation. Oettinger (2005), for example,
implicitly relies on the exogeneity of parents’ ﬁnancial support for U.S. college students
to generate instrumental variables estimates of the negative eﬀect of students’ in-school
employment on their grade point average.
At the same time, assuming that parents’ support of their young-adult children is
independent of what those children do is rather heroic. Economic theory provides a
number of reasons to believe that S and A will be jointly determined. This implies that,
in general, it is not possible to give a causal interpretation to the estimated eﬀect of6
parental support on young people’s educational and labor market investments. Instead,
the estimation equation traces out an “equilibrium” relationship across families between
support and activities. This relationship may arise through a process of bargaining within
each family, for example, in which outcomes diﬀer across families due to heterogeneity in
parents’ and youths’ earnings ability (and hence income levels), in youths’ preferences for
and ability to study, in parents’ and youth’ preferences for consumption versus leisure, in
t h ew a yf a m i l ym e m b e r sc a r ea b o ut each other’s happiness, etc.
Empirical researchers interested in the eﬀect of parents’ ﬁnancial transfers on their ado-
lescent (as opposed to young adult) children’s labor supply have attempted to deal with
these issues by using simultaneous equation models (e.g. Wolﬀ, 2006; Dustmann et al.,
2009) or ﬁxed-eﬀects two-stage least squares estimation (e.g. Gong, 2009).3 Importantly,
Dustmann et al. (2009) explicitly allow for the possibility that teenagers’ behavior inﬂu-
ences parents’ decisions about the transfers they make. The authors are unable to reject
a simple model in which parents determine transfers without taking teenagers’ utility into
account against a more complex model in which parents are altruistic and teenagers’ labor
supply aﬀects their parents’ transfers. Thus, the estimated equilibrium relationship may
be quite close to the causal relationship — at least in simple settings where the focus on
adolescents implies that all young people are co-residing and engaged in secondary-school
education so that only ﬁnancial transfers and employment are of concern.
Matters become much more complicated when the potential tradeoﬀs between alter-
native forms of parental support and young adults’ (as opposed to adolescents’) activities
are considered. Researchers attempting to disentangle the eﬀects of parental support on
young adults’ human capital investments more generally usually focus on only a subset
of these relationships. Identiﬁcation is typically achieved through either theoretical re-
strictions (e.g. on preferences or the type of bargaining game between parents and young
people) which limit the degree of endogeneity and simultaneity or through ad hoc em-
pirical exclusion restrictions (e.g. Kalenkoski, 2008; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Keane
and Wolpin, 2010; Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010; Mart´ ınez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo,
3Pabilonia (2001) ignores the potential endogeneity of parental transfers and simply estimates the
association between adolescents’ hours of work the allowance they receive from their parents.7
2002).
Given the wide range of factors we consider, we are reluctant to rely on such restrictions
to achieve identiﬁcation. It is also very diﬃcult, unfortunately, to sign the “simultaneity
bias” present in a simple regression estimate of the ζags. Consequently, we focus instead
on analyzing the observed relationships between socioeconomic disadvantage, parental
support, and young people’s educational and labor market investments. We avoid in-
terpreting our estimates as causal eﬀects. Nonetheless, our estimates are important in
understanding the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and parental support. In
particular, our analysis illustrates the extent to which diﬀerences in the educational and
employment outcomes of young people growing up in socioeconomic disadvantage can be
explained by disparities in the parental support they receive. Understanding the pathway
through which disadvantage inﬂuences outcomes is a necessary ﬁrst step in formulating
policy initiatives to assist disadvantaged young people in successfully completing their
education and entering the labor market.
3 Data: The Youth in Focus Survey
The data used in this research come from the Youth in Focus (YIF) Project.4 The YIF
data are unique in combining survey data for a birth cohort of young Australians and
their mothers with historical administrative data on the public beneﬁts families received
while young people were growing up. Coverage of the administrative data begins when
young people were approximately three years of age, while the survey data provide de-
tailed information about youths’ and mothers’ current situation and activities as well as
retrospective information on events which occurred during youths’ childhoods.5 In this
section, we discuss the data construction and analysis sample in more detail and introduce
a measure of the family’s history of socioeconomic disadvantage.
4For more information about the project and data see http://youthinfocus.anu.edu.au and Breunig
et al. (2009).
5Data from mothers are not used in this analysis.8
3.1 Data Construction and Estimation Sample
The YIF Project uses Centrelink administrative records to identify all young people born
in the six-month period between October 1, 1987 and March 31, 1988 who ever had con-
tact (directly or indirectly) with the Australian public-beneﬁts system between January,
1991 and March, 2005 (inclusive). These administrative records contain high-quality,
fortnightly information on the incidence of payments for all Australians who received a
wide range of government beneﬁts. The range of beneﬁts include welfare payments to
the unemployed, the disabled, and low-income parents etc. as well as payments which the
Australian government does not consider to be “welfare” such as the Family Tax Beneﬁt
and the Child Care Beneﬁt.6 Although young people can appear in the administrative
data if they have received public beneﬁts themselves, most enter the system because a
family member (usually a parent) received a payment which depended in part on the
youth’s relationship to the payee. Many families received welfare at some point in this
period, however, approximately 40 percent of families did not. These families appear
in the administrative data only because they received either Family Tax Beneﬁts, Child
Care Beneﬁts or one of the precursors of these programs. The generosity of the Aus-
tralian public-beneﬁts system implies that nearly all of the young people in our birth
cohort appear in the administrative data at some point during the period.7
The administrative data were used to stratify youths into one of six groups depending
on the timing and the intensity of the family’s welfare receipt. A stratiﬁed random
sample of youths was then selected from the administrative data for interview in 2006.
Data from phone interviews with the youths as well as a self-completion questionnaire
were then linked to the administrative data.8 Youths were re-interviewed again in Wave 2
6Note that the Child Care Beneﬁt is not means tested and that only families in the top 20 percent
of the income distribution are ineligible for the Family Tax Beneﬁt. To place these payments in context,
similar beneﬁts in the United States are provided to families through the tax system in the form of
standard deductions for dependent children and child care rebates.
7Comparing the YIF youth sample with Australian Census data suggests that the administrative data
capture about 98 percent of the youths born in the period (Breunig et al., 2009).
8Following best practice (see Groves et al., 2004), approach letters, incentive payments, repeated
callbacks, and CATI were all used to maximize response rates. The response rate for youths was 37.2
percent and more than 96 percent of young people completing the survey consented to having this
information linked to their families’ administrative public-beneﬁts records. Although response rates
diﬀered somewhat across strata, these diﬀerences stem primarily from diﬀerences in contact rates rather
than refusal rates (Breunig et al., 2009).9
in 2008.
The achieved number of interviews was 4079 in Wave 1 and 2362 in Wave 2. For
simplicity, we will refer to the youths as 18-year-olds in Wave 1 and as 20-year-olds
in Wave 2.9 In constructing our estimation samples, we necessarily drop a number of
observations due to item nonresponse. We also drop anyone who is attending secondary
school at the time of the interview.
3.2 Socioeconomic Disadvantage
Our summary measure of the family’s socioeconomic disadvantage is derived from the
family’s history of welfare receipt. Speciﬁcally, we identify three groups of young people
as follows: those from families with no history of welfare receipt while the youth was grow-
ing up, those from families receiving welfare in less than six years, and those from families
that received welfare for six or more years. For simplicity, we refer to these youths as hav-
ing experienced no disadvantage (“No”), moderate disadvantage (“Mod”) and extensive
disadvantage (“Ext”), respectively. As explained in the Introduction, the receipt of wel-
fare payments reﬂects not only (temporary or persistent) poverty, but also broader social
circumstances such as unemployment, family breakdown, single parenthood, disability
etc.
Table 1 describes the relationship between the degree of socioeconomic disadvantage
that families have experienced and the support that they are currently providing to their
young-adult children.10 We are particularly interested in both the ﬁnancial transfers
young people receive from their parents as well as support that comes in the form of
co-residence.11 Our results suggest that there is a clear link between socioeconomic disad-
vantage and family support for young adults. Higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage
9At the time of their Wave 1 interviews 92 percent of youths were 18 years of age, while 4 percent
had turned 19 and the remaining 4 percent had unknown ages. At the time of the Wave 2 interview, 76
percent of youths were aged 20 and 21 percent were aged 21 with 3 percent having unknown ages.
10The YIF survey asks youths to report about ﬁnancial transfers received from their parents and
“anyone else”. For simplicity we refer to these amounts as parental support. Youths are also asked if
they are expected to pay back any of this money. We consider the entire amount a loan if they answer
yes to this question.
11Some young people live with relatives or other (older) adults. We determine whether they “co-reside”
or “live independently” based on whether they consider any of the adults in their household a “parental
ﬁgure” and on whether they consider themselves to be living independently or not.10
are associated with an increased tendency for young people to be living independently and
receiving no ﬁnancial support from their families at age 18. Fully 15.6 percent of those
young people growing up in extensive disadvantage receive no parental support at all, for
example, which is true of only 2.3 percent of their peers experiencing no socioeconomic
disadvantage. Overall, those growing up in extensive disadvantage are almost twice as
likely as those experiencing no disadvantage (26.1 versus 14.1 percent) to be living inde-
pendently of their parents at age 18, and just under half (46.4 percent) of disadvantaged
18-year-olds receive no ﬁnancial transfers from their parents at all. Transfer amounts for
those who receive them are lower, and the likelihood that (some of) the transfer is a loan
instead of a gift is higher, the more disadvantaged families are.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Not surprisingly, there a clear progression towards increased independence between
the ages of 18 and 20. Irrespective of their socioeconomic background, young adults
are increasingly likely to be living independently and supporting themselves. Still, the
relative eﬀects of family circumstances continue to be apparent. Growing up in a family
with a long history of welfare receipt is associated with a high probability (26.0 percent)
of receiving neither ﬁnancial nor co-residential support from one’s parents at age 20.
Almost two-thirds of disadvantaged 20-year-olds receive no ﬁnancial support from their
parents, and more than one in three is living independently. In comparison, the majority
(55.7 percent) of young people growing up in families with no history of welfare receipt
are receiving ﬁnancial transfers from their parents at age 20, and almost three in four
continue to live at home.
Table 2 shows that young adults’ engagement in education and employment is closely
linked to their family circumstances. Those young people experiencing extensive disad-
vantage have high rates of disengagement with nearly one in ﬁve (17.5 percent) being
neither employed nor engaged in study at age 18. In contrast, this is true of only 4.5 per-
cent of 18-year-olds experiencing no socioeconomic disadvantage. These diﬀerences are
largely driven by the high enrollment rates (70.0 percent) of young people in relatively11
advantaged families relative to those in disadvantaged families (48.2 percent). In contrast,
the employment rates of 18-year-olds varies much less by family circumstances.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
By age 20, the disparity in enrollment rates has narrowed somewhat suggesting that
disadvantaged young people may be delaying rather than abandoning further study. Still,
it remains the case that there is a persistent relationship between family circumstances
and the engagement of young people in either education or employment.
4R e s u l t s
Our goal is twofold. First, we would like to know whether or not socioeconomic dis-
advantage limits the ﬁnancial and co-residential support that parents provide to their
young-adult children. Second, we would like to understand whether diﬀerences in the
likelihood that young people growing up in disadvantage are studying or employed could
be the result of disparities in the parental support they receive. We address these issues by
estimating multinomial logit models of (i) the parental support that young people receive
and (ii) conditional on that support, young people’s participation in education and the
labor market. We will focus our discussion on the links between family background, co-
residential and ﬁnancial support, and youths’ engagement in employment and education.
Full estimation results are presented in the appendix tables.
4.1 Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Parental Support
Does the co-residential and ﬁnancial support that young people receive from their parents
depend on their socioeconomic backgrounds? We answer this question by estimating a
multinomial logit model of the six possible combinations of co-residential support (i.e.
yes or no) and ﬁnancial transfer receipt (i.e. none, gifts, or loans). To facilitate inter-
pretation, we present and discuss estimated probability distributions for each category
of socioeconomic circumstances evaluated at the overall (weighted) sample mean of other
covariates. These distributions correspond to the expected outcomes for a young person12
with “average” characteristics. The marginal eﬀect of being in alternative categories of
socioeconomic circumstances can be derived by taking diﬀerences in the results between
the rows within each panel. This eﬀectively provides an answer to the following thought
experiment: How would the “average” young person’s likelihood of receiving parental sup-
port change if he had grown up in one set of family circumstances rather than another?
The top panel of Table 3 presents results for 18 year-olds just completing secondary school
(i.e. Wave 1), while the bottom panel of the table presents results for Wave 2 when young
people are 20 years of age.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Young adults are more likely to be fully independent and receive no parental support
the more disadvantaged their families are. In particular, the typical 18 year-old has
an 8.0 percent probability of living independently and receiving no ﬁnancial support
from his parents if his family received extensive welfare beneﬁts. Moderate (as opposed
to extensive) welfare receipt reduces this probability by 2.4 percentage points (to 5.6
percent), while the absence of any welfare receipt is associated with a 5.3 percentage
point reduction (to 2.7 percent) in the probability of being fully independent of one’s
parents.
Financial transfers, either in the form of gifts or loans, are more closely linked to fam-
ilies’ socioeconomic disadvantage than is co-residence. More precisely, the socioeconomic
gradient is much steeper for ﬁnancial transfers than it is for co-residence. An 18 year-old
has a probability of co-residing (whether or not he receives transfers), for example, which
ranges from 85.9 percent if his family has no welfare history to 82.8 if his family received
extensive welfare assistance. In contrast, the probability of receiving transfers (irrespec-
tive of co-residence status) ranges much more widely from 75.7 percent (no welfare receipt)
to 61.4 percent (extensive welfare receipt).
It is interesting to note that although the receipt of ﬁnancial transfers varies sharply
with socioeconomic circumstances, the form of those transfers (i.e. gifts or loans) does
not. Eighteen year-olds living independently and receiving ﬁnancial transfers from their
parents are between 2.3 and 2.7 times as likely to receive a gift as a loan irrespective13
of their family’s welfare history. The ratio of gifts to loans is somewhat lower for those
young people living at home, but does not vary much with socioeconomic disadvantage and
remains constant as young people age. Thus, socioeconomic disadvantage is associated
with young people being less likely to receive ﬁnancial assistance from their parents, but
conditional on receiving ﬁnancial help, disadvantaged youth are as likely as their more
advantaged peers to receive a gift rather than a loan.
That socioeconomic disadvantage constrains the receipt of ﬁnancial transfers more
than co-residence is consistent with the nonrival (public) nature of housing and the ri-
val (private) nature of ﬁnancial transfers. Parents wishing to support their young-adult
children will typically ﬁnd it less expensive to do so through co-residence than through
direct ﬁnancial transfers. Kaplan (2010) argues that the option to move in and out of
the parental home is a particularly valuable insurance mechanism for youths from poor
families precisely because their families would struggle to provide ﬁnancial assistance in
the event they need help. Our results suggest, however, that the option to co-reside may
also be more limited for disadvantaged youths.
The receipt of parental support as young people enter their early 20s continues to
be closely linked to their families’ socioeconomic circumstances while they were growing
up. The absolute disparities associated with socioeconomic disadvantage are, in many
cases, even larger at age 20 than at age 18, though the proportional diﬀerences are often
smaller. For example, receiving extensive as opposed to no welfare assistance while young
is associated with a 7.7 percentage point increase in the probability that the typical 20
year-old receives no parental support in comparison to a 5.3 percentage point increase at
age 18.
Not surprisingly, young people are more likely to live independently of their parents at
age 20 than they were at age 18 irrespective of their families’ socioeconomic circumstances.
Young people leave home earlier, however, if their families were supported by the welfare
system while they were growing up. Speciﬁcally, the probability that a 20 year-old is
living with his parents is 68.4 percent if his family received extensive welfare assistance
— down from 82.8 percent at age 18. This represents a 14.4 percentage point decrease in14
the likelihood of intergenerational co-residence. In contrast, the chances of living at home
is 11.5 percentage points lower (85.9 versus 74.4 percent) at age 20 than at age 18 if the
family has never been on the welfare rolls. These trends imply that the socioeconomic
gradient in co-residence is steeper at age 20 than at age 18.
Similarly, receiving ﬁnancial support is also more closely tied to one’s family circum-
stances at age 20 than at age 18. About half (49.2 percent) of 20 year-olds in families
with no welfare history receive money from their parents. This is true, however, of just
over one third (38.4 percent) of 20 year-olds in families with extensive welfare experi-
ence.12 The steepening of the socioeconomic gradient between waves is consistent with
parental support becoming more “optional”, and therefore, resource constraints becom-
ing more binding, as young people age. At the same time, Aquilino (2005) ﬁnds that
parents believe they have more obligation to help their adult children out of ﬁnancial
diﬃculty than is true for their co-residing adolescent children. Thus, it may be a lack or
resources, rather than a lack of willingness, which leads disadvantaged families to provide
less ﬁnancial support relative to more advantaged families as youths become older.
Taken together, our results demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between
a family’s welfare history and the support parents provide to young-adult children as
they complete their education and enter the labor market. Young people growing up in
disadvantage are substantially more likely to be residentially and ﬁnancially independent
of their parents than are their peers growing up in more advantaged circumstances. This
is consistent with Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (2001) who also ﬁnd that parental as-
sistance to young-adult children is also more common among Israeli families from higher
socioeconomic origins.
4.2 Youths’ Engagement in Education and Employment
Is young people’s participation in education and employment related to the parental
support that they receive? Does this relationship vary by the family’s socioeconomic
circumstances? We address these questions by estimating a multinomial logit model of
12This diﬀerential is proportionately greater than that among 18 year-olds. At age 20, the socioeco-
nomic gradient in ﬁnancial transfers continues to be steeper than that in co-residence.15
the probability that young people are engaged in: (i) study and full-time work; (ii) study
and part-time work; (iii) study and no work; (iv) no study and full-time work; (v) no
study and part-time work; and (vi) neither study nor work.
We condition our estimates on the parental support that young people receive as well
as a number of other control variables. Likelihood-ratio tests indicated that separately
identifying ﬁnancial loans from no ﬁnancial support does not improve the overall ﬁt of the
model.13 For simplicity, therefore, we diﬀerentiate only between the receipt (or not) of
ﬁnancial gifts and whether or not youth are co-residing in the estimation results presented
in this section.
As explained in Section 2.3, we fully recognize that parental support and youth out-
comes are likely to be jointly determined. Accordingly, we do not interpret the estimated
eﬀects of parental support on youth activities as causal, although we do speculate on what
causal mechanisms are likely to be driving the observed associations. In Section 4.2.1,
we discuss the relationship between parental support, youth outcomes and socioeconomic
circumstances. In Section 4.2.2, we focus on the socioeconomic gradient in youth out-
comes.
4.2.1 How does parental support matter?
To what extent are the outcomes of young people related to the residential and ﬁnancial
support they are able to garner from their parents? Is a relative lack of parental support
associated with a lower propensity to be engaged in education or employment? To address
these questions, we begin by calculating estimated probability distributions evaluated at
the overall sample mean. We then use these probability distributions to make three broad
comparisons. First, we compare the outcomes of youths who do and do not receive gifts
taking into account whether they co-reside. Second, we compare the outcomes of co-
residing and independent youths taking into account whether they receive ﬁnancial gifts.
Finally, we compare the outcomes of youths who receive both residential support and
13A range of speciﬁcation tests are shown in Appendix Table A3. The full model of youth outcomes
includes six categories of parental support. Combining loans and gifts is clearly rejected for all groups
except those in Wave 2 who live independently. Combining loans and receiving no ﬁnancial support is
not rejected for any group, either individually or jointly across co-residence status.16
ﬁnancial gifts (i.e. full support) with those who receive neither. In order to focus our
discussion, we concentrate on the youths’ overall study and employment rates.
At Age 18: The ﬁrst two left-hand side panels of Table 4 show that receiving ﬁnancial
gifts from one’s parents is associated with 18 year-olds studying more and working less
whether or not they are living with their parents.14 This pattern is nearly identical for
all young people though the diﬀerence is often larger for youths living apart from their
parents. Socioeconomic disadvantage is typically associated with greater disparity in the
study rates of those who do and do not receive gifts, but with smaller diﬀerences in
full-time and nonemployment rates. For example, extensively disadvantaged 18 year-olds
receiving gifts have study rates that are 10.1 percentage points higher if they live at
home and 16.9 percentage points higher if they do not, relative to similarly disadvantaged
youths who do not receive ﬁnancial gifts. Financial gifts are associated with much less
disparity in study rates of advantaged youths. The disparity in employment rates linked
to ﬁnancial gifts is largest for youths growing up in families with no welfare history. In
particular, advantaged youths living independently are much less likely to be working full-
time (22.1 percentage points) and much more likely to be not employed (18.5 percentage
points) if they receive ﬁnancial gifts than if they do not. In contrast, the employment
rates of extensively disadvantaged youth vary much less by whether they are receiving
ﬁnancial gifts from their parents. Thus, ﬁnancial gifts are relatively more important
in understanding which extensively disadvantaged 18 year-olds are studying and which
advantaged 18 year-olds are working. One possibility is that young adults from advantaged
families use gifts to support their studies while youths from disadvantaged families use
gifts to support them while not working. Or conversely, disadvantaged parents target
ﬁnancial gifts towards their children who are studying, while advantaged parents target
ﬁnancial gifts towards their children who are not working.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The third and fourth panels in the left-hand side of Table 4 show that co-residence,
14The single exception is the group who live independently and whose families received extensive
welfare; they have a lower probability of not working if they receive gifts.17
unlike ﬁnancial gifts, is associated with lower rather than higher rates of studying.15 The
size of the gap does not depend much on family circumstances and is slightly larger for
youths who receive ﬁnancial gifts. For example, the study rate for 18 year-olds experienc-
ing extensive disadvantage and receiving gifts is 14.7 percentage points lower if they live
with their parents than if they do not; if they are not receiving gifts their study rate is 7.9
percentage points lower when co-residing. The disparity in the study rates of advantaged
youths are very similar. This relationship is consistent with a story in which parental sup-
port in the form of co-residence discourages young people from studying. Alternatively,
these results suggest that young people who leave home by age 18 may be doing so in
order to continue their studies.
The link between co-residence and employment rates is weaker and more complex
than that between co-residence and study. Living with one’s parents is associated with
an increase in part-time employment, and a corresponding fall in both full-time work
and nonemployment, among both advantaged youths and youths experiencing moderate
disadvantage. For example, advantaged 18 year-olds who do not receive gifts are 9.6
percentage points more likely to be employed part-time if they co-reside than if they live
independently; if they do receive gifts they are 13.2 percentage points more likely to work
part time. In contrast, the patterns for 18 year-olds experiencing extensive disadvantage
diﬀer between those who do and do not receive gifts. Speciﬁcally, living with ones parents
is associated with a modest increase in nonemployment rates, at the expense of lower
rates of part-time work, for those who receive gifts, while co-residence for those who do
not receive gifts is associated with a large shift from not working to full-time employment.
Overall, receiving full parental support (i.e. both co-residing and receiving ﬁnancial
gifts) versus receiving no parental support is associated with a 6.0 percentage point fall in
the chances that 18 year-olds from families with no welfare history are studying. On the
other hand, full parental support is associated with an increased study rate of between
2.2 (extensive) and 14.8 (moderate) percentage points for disadvantaged youths. One
possible interpretation is that advantaged parents appear to be targeting their support
15The single exception is that 18 year-olds experiencing moderate socioeconomic disadvantage who do
not receive ﬁnancial gifts are more likely to be studying if they co-reside rather than live independently.18
towards their 18 year-old children who are not studying, while parents with any welfare
history provide relatively more support to their 18 year-olds who are studying.
At the same time, receiving both residential support and ﬁnancial gifts is associated
with lower full-time and nonemployment rates for almost all 18 year-olds.16 The link be-
tween full parental support and employment outcomes is especially strong for advantaged
youths, however. In particular, full-time employment rates are 23.6 percentage points
lower and nonemployment rates are 6.7 percentage points higher among advantaged 18
year-olds who both co-reside and receive gifts. In contrast, the employment rates of 18
year-olds experiencing extensive socioeconomic disadvantage depend much less on whether
they are receiving full or no parental support. Thus, the labor supply decisions of ad-
vantaged young people may be relatively more responsive to whether or not they receive
support from their parents. Alternatively, advantaged parents may reduce their economic
support for adult children with full-time employment.
At Age 20: The relationship between parental support and youth’s engagement in
education and employment is somewhat diﬀerent at age 20 than at age 18. Twenty year-
olds who receive ﬁnancial gifts from their parents are more likely to be studying, less likely
to be employed full-time, and more likely to be not employed whether or not they live
with their parents. The same is true at age 18. However, these relationships are generally
much stronger among 20 year-olds than among 18 year-olds.17 For example, advantaged
20 year-olds who co-reside are 10.0 percentage points more likely to be studying if they
receive ﬁnancial gifts than if they do not. At age 18, this diﬀerential is only 2.9 percentage
points.
At age 18, co-residence is almost universally associated with a large decline in study
rates, suggesting perhaps that those young people who leave home before age 18 dispro-
portionately do so in order to begin their studies elsewhere. However, in many cases
20 year-olds are as likely to be studying whether or not they continue living with their
16The exceptions are that young people whose families received extensive welfare have a higher proba-
bility of working full time and young people whose families never received welfare have a higher probability
of not working, if they receive full support.
17Note that while some of the diﬀerences across categories of socioeconomic circumstances in Table 4
are individually statistically signiﬁcant, they are not jointly signiﬁcant (see Table A3).19
parents. Speciﬁcally, co-residing and independent 20 year-olds have study rates that are
virtually identical if they are from an advantaged family and receive gifts or if they are
from moderately or extensively disadvantaged families and do not receive gifts. On the
other hand, co-residence is associated with study rates that are lower (6.8–7.0 percentage
points) among 20-year olds with a welfare history who do receive ﬁnancial gifts, but higher
(7.4 percentage points) for youths with no welfare history who do not receive ﬁnancial
gifts. Regarding work, co-residence is associated with higher part-time employment rates,
generally with both lower full-time rates and lower nonemployment rates.
On balance, the disparity in the study and employment outcomes of youths who
receive full versus no parental support is much larger at age 20 than it is at age 18.
Perhaps parental support is more heavily targeted towards those 20 year-olds who are
either studying, working part time, or not working at all. Moreover, it is interesting to
note that these changes in support patterns are particularly important for understanding
the study and employment outcomes of advantaged 20 year-olds who have no family
history of welfare receipt. For example, full support is associated with a 17.4 percentage
point increase in the likelihood that 20 year-olds with no welfare history are studying. In
comparison, at age 18, full support was associated with a 6.0 percentage point reduction
in study rates for these young people. Similarly, the reduction in full-time employment
rates associated with full parental support among advantaged youths is 23.6 percentage
points at age 18 and 30.6 percentage points at age 20. One possible explanation is that
parents in advantaged families have moved from supporting 18 year-old nonstudents to
supporting 20 year-old students and to increasingly targeting resources to young people
who are not in full-time work. To a lesser degree, disadvantaged parents may also target
resources to 20 year-old students who are not working full time.
Discussion: Taken together, our results point to a clear link between parental sup-
port and a young person’s engagement in study and work which is generally stronger at
age 20 than at age 18 and is often stronger for advantaged than for disadvantaged youths.
It is possible that the increasingly discretionary nature of educational investments and
parental support, particularly co-residential support, as young people age may underlie20
the former result. On the other hand, the latter result may indicate that wealthier par-
ents have the resources necessary to target their more generous assistance toward helping
young adults to make investments in education. This is consistent with previous research
which demonstrates that parents use both co-residential and ﬁnancial assistance to sup-
port their children’s human capital investments (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Keane
and Wolpin, 2010; Mart´ ınez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo, 2002).
4.2.2 Can Parental Support Explain the Socioeconomic Gradient in Out-
comes?
These patterns raise interesting questions about what drives the diﬀerences in the ed-
ucational and employment outcomes of youths who do and do not grow up in families
receiving public assistance. Speciﬁcally, disadvantaged families provide less residential
and ﬁnancial support to their young adult children than do other families (see Table 3).
To what extent do disparities in parental support explain the link between young people’s
outcomes and the socioeconomic disadvantage they have experienced?
We address this question by comparing the socioeconomic gradient in outcomes across
a series of counter-factual outcome distributions. Speciﬁcally, we calculate average out-
comes evaluated at (a) individual covariates; (b) the socioeconomic group mean of co-
variates; (c) the socioeconomic group mean of parental support and the overall mean of
all other covariates; and (d) the overall mean of all covariates. All means are weighted.
The ﬁrst case corresponds to the unconditional mean outcomes given in Table 2, while
the last case corresponds to the conditional results summarized in Table 4.18 The two
intermediate counterfactual distributions are helpful in identifying the extent to which
conditioning on certain covariates, in particular diﬀerent levels of parental support, alters
the socioeconomic gradient in expected outcomes. To illustrate, we graphically depict the
results for aggregate study and employment rates in Figure 1. The full set of results is
presented in Appendix Table A5.
The socioeconomic gradient in 18 year-olds’ propensity to be studying is shown in the
18There are minor diﬀerences relative to Table 2 due to dropping observations with missing values for
covariates.21
top-left panel of Figure 1. The diﬀerential in the rate of study among advantaged and ex-
tensively disadvantaged youths is fully 20.7 percentage points when we evaluate outcomes
using individuals-speciﬁc covariates (speciﬁcation a) and 23.5 percentage points when we
evaluate using the socioeconomic group mean of covariates (speciﬁcation b). This diﬀer-
ential is reduced by half, however, when outcomes are evaluated using the overall mean of
all covariates except parental support (speciﬁcation c). Thus, approximately half of the
socioeconomic gradient in studying at age 18 can be explained by the variation across fam-
ily circumstances (i.e. welfare histories) in youths’ characteristics other than the support
they receive from parents (e.g. immigrant status, parental education, etc.). Removing the
eﬀects of diﬀerential parental support across socioeconomic groups by evaluating the rate
of study at the overall mean of all covariates, including parental support, does little to
change this ﬁnding. Thus, it does not appear that it is the link between socioeconomic
disadvantage and parental support which underlies the relationship between disadvantage
and studying at age 18.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The top-right panel of Figure 1 shows that the socioeconomic gradient in study rates
between advantaged and extensively disadvantaged youths is somewhat ﬂatter at age 20
than at age 18 if we evaluate outcomes at either individual-speciﬁc covariates (speciﬁcation
a) or at the socioeconomic group mean of covariates (speciﬁcation b). The socioeconomic
gradient ﬂattens further and becomes essentially zero as we evaluate study rates using
overall means for any covariates other than parental support (speciﬁcation c) and then
for all covariates including parental support (speciﬁcation d). In eﬀect, the socioeconomic
gradient in studying can be completely explained by diﬀerences in the characteristics of
those 20 year-olds growing up in diﬀerent family circumstances.
The socioeconomic gradient in the employment rates of 18 year-olds is shown in the
bottom-left panel of Figure 1. Unlike studying, the diﬀerential probability that advan-
taged and extensively disadvantaged 18 year-olds are employed is not explained by their
characteristics. The socioeconomic gradient in employment is virtually identical whether
we evaluate outcomes at individual-speciﬁc covariates (speciﬁcation a) or at sample-mean22
covariates (speciﬁcation d). Instead, the diﬀerential in employment rates stems either
from diﬀerences in the labor supply behavior of 18 year-olds in diﬀerent family circum-
stances with otherwise similar characteristics or from diﬀerences in the hiring behavior of
employers.
In contrast, the bottom-right panel of Figure 1 shows that the socioeconomic gradient
in the employment rates of 20 year-olds is ﬂatter (10.1 versus 17.3 percentage points) and
more closely linked to disparity in the characteristics of young people than was the case
at age 18. Speciﬁcally, the socioeconomic gradient is much the same whether we evaluate
expected employment outcomes at either individual-speciﬁc covariates (speciﬁcation a) or
the socioeconomic group mean of covariates (speciﬁcation b), but falls substantially when
we remove the eﬀect of diﬀerences in covariates other than parental support (speciﬁcation
c). Accounting for the disparities in parental support has little additional eﬀect on the
socioeconomic gradient in employment rates (speciﬁcation d).
Taken together, these results provide no evidence that a lack of parental support ex-
plains the socioeconomic gradient in either studying or employment among young people.
In most cases, the socioeconomic gradient is substantially reduced, or eﬀectively elimi-
nated, once diﬀerences in characteristics other than parental support are accounted for.
The exception is the socioeconomic gradient in employment at age 18 which is driven by
the diﬀerential propensity of advantaged and disadvantaged young people with the same
characteristics to be employed.19
5 Concluding Remarks
Parents’ economic support can be important in insuring young people against economic
downturns (or relationship breakdowns), reducing any negative eﬀects of credit con-
straints, and generally expanding the resources available to them as they complete their
education and enter the labor market. Family circumstances, however, may dictate both
19As mentioned earlier, the speciﬁcation tests in Table A3 show that the coeﬃcients representing so-
cioeconomic circumstances are not jointly statistically signiﬁcant in the model for study and employment
outcomes at age 20. The results discussed in this section concern a diﬀerent metric, namely predicted
outcomes, and conﬁrms that socioeconomic circumstances play a limited role.23
the ability and the willingness of parents to continue supporting their children after they
reach adulthood. Our results provide evidence that young people who experience socioe-
conomic disadvantage while growing up receive less co-residential and ﬁnancial support
from their parents than do their more advantaged peers. Moreover, there is a clear link
between a young person’s engagement in study and work and the parental support that
he or she receives. Fortunately, however, we ﬁnd no evidence the socioeconomic gradient
in studying and employment stems from this lack of parental support.
These result are useful in highlighting the relationship between a family’s socioeco-
nomic circumstances and the economic support that parents provide to their young-adult
children. At the same time, they leave a number of issues unresolved. First, our analy-
sis has focused on the receipt, rather than the amount, of economic support that young
people receive. This focus on the extensive support margin is sensible given the relatively
small variation in the amount of ﬁnancial support in our data and the inherent diﬃculty
in placing a dollar value on co-residential support. It is less than ideal, however, given
the evidence that the nature of the parental home inﬂuences young people’s propensity to
move out (e.g. Laferr` ere and Bessi` ere, 2003). It would also be useful to know more about
the extent to which young people’s outcomes depend on the degree and type of support
they receive.
Second, we can only speculate about the extent to which the socioeconomic gradient we
observe in parental support stems from disparity in families’ ability, rather than in their
willingness, to provide economic support. In particular, the previous literature clearly
demonstrates that co-residential and ﬁnancial support is tied to family income and wealth
(see Schoeni, 1997, for a review) suggesting that resource constraints must matter. At the
same time, Aquilino (2005) ﬁnds that parents’ ﬁnancial resources (i.e. income, savings,
nonmortgage debts) are not signiﬁcantly related to their perceived ﬁnancial obligations
to their young-adult children. Nontraditional (i.e. step- and blended) families believe
they need to provide less support to their young-adult children even after controlling for
their diﬀerential resources. Thus, it is unclear whether the issue is resource constraints
or diﬀerential preferences.24
Finally, it would be useful to know more about the dynamics of parents’ economic
support and the role of public policy. Why do co-residence and ﬁnancial transfers become
more important for understanding outcomes as young people, and particularly advantaged
young people, age? Does this indicate that families with resources may be increasingly
directing their support to young people making investments in education or with limited
ability to support themselves (see e.g. Card and Lemieux, 1997; Keane and Wolpin, 2010;
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Mart´ ınez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo, 2002). To what
extent are disadvantaged youths’ able to seek out alternative forms of support?
Addressing these issues is an important next step in understanding the role of the
family in supporting young people’s investments in education and work.
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Table 1: Co-residence and Financial Assistance by Socioeconomic Circumstances
No Mod Ext Total
Wave 1 (age 18)
Co-residence and ﬁnancial assistance (percent distribution by column)
Independent, no ﬁnancial assistance 2.37 .01 5 .67 .5
Co-residing, no ﬁnancial assistance 19.32 6 .63 0 .82 4 .8
Independent and receiving gift 8.67 .56 .67 .7
Independent and receiving loan 3.24 .13 .93 .7
Co-residing and receiving gift 41.73 4 .82 9 .53 6 .2
Co-residing and receiving loan 24.72 0 .01 3 .62 0 .2
Amount received excluding zeros (dollars)
Median 2300 1500 1000 1700
90th percentile 12000 10000 6208 10000
Wave 2 (age 20)
Co-residence and ﬁnancial assistance (percent distribution by column)
Independent, no ﬁnancial assistance 11.01 7 .12 6 .01 7 .0
Co-residing, no ﬁnancial assistance 33.33 8 .63 8 .63 6 .4
Independent and receiving gift 10.91 0 .27 .19 .6
Independent and receiving loan 4.04 .04 .24 .1
Co-residing and receiving gift 29.62 0 .21 6 .22 3 .0
Co-residing and receiving loan 11.29 .97 .99 .9
Amount received excluding zeros (dollars)
Median 2500 1500 1153 2000
90th percentile 12104 10000 8000 10000
No, Mod, Ext: no, moderate, and extensive socioeconomic disadvantage. Source: Youth in Focus
Survey data. Sample restricted to respondents who are not in school and have nonmissing values
for parental support and youth outcomes. Weighted estimates; weights not adjusted for sample
restrictions.29
Table 2: Educational and Employment Outcomes by Socioeconomic Circumstances
No Mod Ext Total
Wave 1 (age 18)
Educational and employment outcomes (percent distribution by column)
Study, full-time work 18.02 0 .31 4 .81 7 .8
Study, part-time work 40.92 7 .71 7 .83 0 .4
Study, no work 11.11 3 .21 5 .61 3 .0
No study, full-time work 13.41 6 .81 8 .31 5 .8
No study, part-time work 12.11 3 .91 6 .01 3 .7
No study, no work 4.58 .11 7 .59 .2
Wave 2 (age 20)
Educational and employment outcomes (percent distribution by column)
Study, full-time work 16.31 7 .51 5 .01 6 .3
Study, part-time work 41.02 8 .72 4 .13 2 .5
Study, no work 11.11 0 .51 4 .61 1 .9
No study, full-time work 18.12 5 .32 3 .02 1 .7
No study, part-time work 9.11 1 .21 1 .21 0 .3
No study, no work 4.46 .81 2 .17 .3
No, Mod, Ext: no, moderate, and extensive socioeconomic disadvantage. Source: Youth in Focus
Survey data. Sample restricted to respondents who are not in school and have nonmissing values
for parental support and youth outcomes. Weighted estimates; weights not adjusted for sample
restrictions. Part-time work includes respondents with unknown hours.30
Table 3: Predicted Parental Support
Independent Co-residing Total Total
Gift Loan Nil Gift Loan Nil Cores Ftrfr
Wave 1 (age 18)
No disadv 8.33 .12 .73 9 .22 5 .12 1 .68 5 .97 5 .7
1.20 .60 .61 .71 .61 .71 .51 .7
Mod disadv 7.03 .05 .63 5 .32 1 .62 7 .58 4 .46 6 .9
0.80 .50 .71 .31 .21 .31 .11 .3
Ext disadv 6.72 .58 .03 5 .01 7 .23 0 .58 2 .86 1 .4
1.00 .51 .32 .01 .41 .51 .71 .7
Wave 2 (age 20)
No disadv 9.53 .61 2 .52 4 .91 1 .23 8 .47 4 .44 9 .2
1.30 .91 .62 .21 .82 .42 .22 .2
Mod disadv 9.63 .51 5 .81 9 .89 .64 1 .87 1 .24 2 .4
1.20 .61 .41 .71 .51 .81 .61 .9
Ext disadv 8.13 .32 0 .21 9 .47 .64 1 .46 8 .43 8 .4
1.20 .82 .22 .01 .62 .52 .52 .4
Gift, loan, nil: receiving ﬁnancial assistance in the form of gifts or loans, or not receiving ﬁnan-
cial assistance from parents; Cores: co-residing; Ftrfr: receiving ﬁnancial transfers; No, Mod,
Ext disadv: no, moderate and extensive socioeconomic disadvantage. Standard errors in italics
(nonparametric bootstrap with ﬁxed evaluation points). Source: Youth in Focus Survey data.
Sample restricted to respondents who are not in school and have nonmissing values for parental
support, youth outcomes and all covariates. Predictions based on multinomial logit models with
six categories of parental support evaluated at overall weighted sample means, see Tables A1
and A2.31
Table 4: Comparisons of Predicted Educational and Employment Outcomes
Wave 1 (age 18) Wave 2 (age 20)
Stdy FtW PtW NoW Stdy FtW PtW NoW
The eﬀect of receiving ﬁnancial gifts (gift versus no gift) if co-residing
No disadv 3.0 −16.87 .29 .61 0 .0 −20.35 .21 5 .1
4.04 .03 .83 .15 .45 .05 .34 .6
Mod disadv 5.9 −14.34 .41 0 .01 1 .6 −18.22 .91 5 .3
3.53 .22 .92 .75 .05 .14 .93 .9
Ext disadv 10.1 −15.86 .19 .71 4 .1 −20.47 .71 2 .7
3.93 .73 .93 .36 .65 .66 .35 .3
The eﬀect of receiving ﬁnancial gifts (gift versus no gift) if independent
No disadv 6.4 −22.13 .61 8 .51 8 .1 −22.61 5 .27 .4
8.89 .38 .58 .18 .79 .28 .27 .5
Mod disadv 23.9 −12.44 .47 .91 8 .0 −22.87 .01 5 .8
6.07 .86 .56 .67 .26 .75 .86 .4
Ext disadv 16.9 −2.81 1 .6 −8.72 1 .7 −10.2 −7.41 7 .6
6.76 .47 .26 .26 .98 .37 .36 .5
The eﬀect of co-residence (co-residing versus independent) if receiving gift
No disadv −12.5 −1.41 3 .2 −11.8 −0.7 −8.09 .7 −1.8
5.95 .76 .36 .37 .28 .37 .77 .5
Mod disadv −9.1 −2.31 6 .5 −14.2 −7.01 .17 .5 −8.6
5.85 .95 .05 .37 .26 .86 .16 .9
Ext disadv −14.71 .5 −7.45 .9 −6.8 −7.31 4 .7 −7.5
5.86 .26 .95 .98 .17 .37 .48 .3
The eﬀect of co-residence (co-residing versus independent) if not receiving gift
No disadv −9.0 −6.89 .6 −2.97 .4 −10.31 9 .8 −9.5
7.37 .98 .16 .46 .66 .95 .95 .2
Mod disadv 9.0 −0.31 6 .6 −16.2 −0.6 −3.61 1 .7 −8.1
4.25 .34 .34 .35 .45 .24 .63 .3
Ext disadv −7.91 4 .5 −2.0 −12.50 .72 .9 −0.4 −2.5
4.13 .34 .33 .45 .25 .35 .33 .6
The eﬀect of full parental support versus no support
No disadv −6.0 −23.61 6 .86 .71 7 .4 −30.62 5 .05 .6
7.38 .07 .76 .47 .37 .36 .16 .3
Mod disadv 14.8 −14.72 0 .9 −6.31 1 .0 −21.71 4 .67 .2
4.15 .64 .64 .95 .76 .25 .85 .0
Ext disadv 2.2 −1.34 .2 −2.81 4 .9 −17.47 .31 0 .1
5.23 .64 .54 .57 .15 .86 .95 .3
Stdy: Studying (whether working or not); FtW, PtW, NoW: full-time, part-time, and no work
(whether studying or not); No, Mod, Ext disadv: no, moderate and extensive socioeconomic dis-
advantage. Standard errors in italics (nonparametric bootstrap with ﬁxed evaluation points). Source:
Youth in Focus Survey data. Sample restricted to respondents who are not in school and have non-
missing values for parental support, youth outcomes and all covariates. Part-time work includes
respondents with unknown hours. Predictions based on multinomial logit models with six categories
of educational and employment outcomes (all combinations of studying and full-time/part-time/no
work) evaluated at overall weighted sample means, see Tables A1 and A4.32
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No, Mod, Ext: no, moderate, and extensive socioeconomic disadvantage; (a), (b), (c), (d): predic-
tions evaluated at (a) observed covariates, (b) socioeconomic group means of all covariates, (c) so-
cioeconomic group means of parental support and overall means of other covariates, (d) overall
means of all covariates. Source: Youth in Focus Survey data. Sample restricted to respondents
who are not in school and have nonmissing values for parental support, youth outcomes and all
covariates. Part-time work includes respondents with unknown hours. Predictions based on multi-
nomial logit models with six categories of educational and employment outcomes (all combinations
of studying and full-time/part-time/no work) evaluated at weighted sample means, see Table A5.
Figure 1: Predicted Educational and Employment Outcomes33
Table A1: Covariate Means and Sample Sizes
Wave 1 (age 18) Wave 2 (age 20)
All No Mod Ext All No Mod Ext
Socioeconomic circumstances
No disadv 0.422 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.418 1.000 0.000 0.000
Mod disadv 0.308 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.316 0.000 1.000 0.000
Ext disadv 0.270 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.267 0.000 0.000 1.000
Parental support
Cores, gift 0.365 0.418 0.349 0.299 0.229 0.292 0.201 0.163
Cores, no gift 0.450 0.440 0.470 0.442 0.463 0.446 0.488 0.460
Indpt, no gift 0.108 0.055 0.107 0.192 0.211 0.151 0.211 0.305
Indpt, gift 0.078 0.088 0.074 0.067 0.097 0.111 0.100 0.072
Age (months minus 220)
Mean 5.052 5.079 5.018 5.050 30.27 30.22 30.27 30.33
Highest level of school completed
Not Year 12 0.256 0.153 0.260 0.412 0.180 0.109 0.185 0.287
Year 12 0.744 0.847 0.740 0.588 0.820 0.891 0.815 0.713
Home state
NSW+ACT 0.324 0.332 0.314 0.323 0.323 0.342 0.301 0.320
VIC 0.250 0.259 0.266 0.218 0.268 0.265 0.300 0.236
QLD 0.213 0.188 0.225 0.240 0.204 0.196 0.209 0.211
SA 0.079 0.084 0.066 0.086 0.075 0.074 0.068 0.083
WA+NT 0.110 0.118 0.104 0.103 0.099 0.101 0.096 0.100
TAS 0.024 0.019 0.025 0.029 0.031 0.022 0.026 0.050
Health status fair or poor
No 0.918 0.937 0.917 0.888 0.925 0.928 0.927 0.917
Yes 0.082 0.063 0.083 0.112 0.075 0.072 0.073 0.083
Health limits amount of work
No 0.934 0.948 0.931 0.916 0.930 0.950 0.931 0.897
Yes 0.066 0.052 0.069 0.084 0.070 0.050 0.069 0.103
Sex
Female 0.492 0.491 0.496 0.488 0.489 0.484 0.492 0.495
Male 0.508 0.509 0.504 0.512 0.511 0.516 0.508 0.505
Birth year
1987 0.518 0.524 0.517 0.511 0.489 0.498 0.484 0.482
1988 0.482 0.476 0.483 0.489 0.511 0.502 0.516 0.518
Continued next page.34
Table A1 continued
Wave 1 (age 18) Wave 2 (age 20)
All No Mod Ext All No Mod Ext
Mother born overseas
No 0.734 0.763 0.715 0.711 0.738 0.769 0.719 0.714
Yes 0.266 0.237 0.285 0.289 0.262 0.231 0.281 0.286
Father born overseas
No 0.710 0.728 0.697 0.697 0.701 0.722 0.690 0.681
Yes 0.290 0.272 0.303 0.303 0.299 0.278 0.310 0.319
Ever lived with stepparent
No 0.847 0.957 0.827 0.698 0.861 0.961 0.830 0.741
Yes 0.153 0.043 0.173 0.302 0.139 0.039 0.170 0.259
Ever lived with single parent
No 0.699 0.905 0.690 0.387 0.710 0.901 0.713 0.406
Yes 0.301 0.095 0.310 0.613 0.290 0.099 0.287 0.594
Ever lived with grandparents, foster parents etc.
No 0.911 0.966 0.910 0.826 0.918 0.965 0.912 0.851
Yes 0.089 0.034 0.090 0.174 0.082 0.035 0.088 0.149
Mother completed Year 12 (age 14)
No 0.522 0.405 0.558 0.662 0.496 0.368 0.546 0.636
Yes 0.478 0.595 0.442 0.338 0.504 0.632 0.454 0.364
Mother’s education (age 14) missing
No 0.919 0.948 0.916 0.880 0.930 0.957 0.927 0.891
Yes 0.081 0.052 0.084 0.120 0.070 0.043 0.073 0.109
Mother employed (age 14)
No 0.314 0.215 0.304 0.482 0.320 0.214 0.316 0.490
Yes 0.686 0.785 0.696 0.518 0.680 0.786 0.684 0.510
Mother’s employment (age 14) missing
No 0.969 0.985 0.969 0.945 0.973 0.987 0.976 0.947
Yes 0.031 0.015 0.031 0.055 0.027 0.013 0.024 0.053
Mother’s occupational status (age 14)
Mean ANU4 scale 0.378 0.449 0.373 0.273 0.394 0.474 0.386 0.279
Mother’s occupation (age 14): other
No 0.986 0.983 0.989 0.988
Yes 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.012
Mother’s occupation (age 14): none or missing (wave 2 including other)
No 0.938 0.951 0.938 0.918 0.820 0.886 0.833 0.702
Yes 0.062 0.049 0.062 0.082 0.180 0.114 0.167 0.298
Continued next page.35
Table A1 continued
Wave 1 (age 18) Wave 2 (age 20)
All No Mod Ext All No Mod Ext
Father completed Year 12 (age 14)
No 0.580 0.442 0.608 0.764 0.546 0.406 0.583 0.722
Yes 0.420 0.558 0.392 0.236 0.454 0.594 0.417 0.278
Father’s education (age 14) missing
No 0.853 0.949 0.872 0.682 0.871 0.956 0.882 0.723
Yes 0.147 0.051 0.128 0.318 0.129 0.044 0.118 0.277
Father employed (age 14)
No 0.182 0.041 0.139 0.452 0.170 0.033 0.124 0.441
Yes 0.818 0.959 0.861 0.548 0.830 0.967 0.876 0.559
Father’s employment (age 14) missing
No 0.896 0.981 0.925 0.729 0.904 0.982 0.928 0.755
Yes 0.104 0.019 0.075 0.271 0.096 0.018 0.072 0.245
Father’s occupational status (age 14)
Mean ANU4 scale 0.381 0.486 0.360 0.242 0.404 0.514 0.379 0.262
Father’s occupation (age 14): other or missing
No 0.835 0.931 0.857 0.659 0.853 0.948 0.864 0.689
Yes 0.165 0.069 0.143 0.341 0.147 0.052 0.136 0.311
Number of observations
Total 4079 1027 1580 1472 2362 692 913 757
Descript sample 3527 898 1341 1288 2263 661 875 727
Regressn sample 3342 871 1282 1189 2150 641 840 669
All: full estimation sample; No, Mod, Ext (disadv): no, moderate, and extensive socioeconomic
disadvantage; Descript sample: respondents who are not in school and have nonmissing values for
parental support and youth outcomes (see Tables 1 and 2); Regressn sample: respondents who are
not in school and have nonmissing values for parental support, youth outcomes and all covariates
(used for regression analysis). Source: Youth in Focus Survey data. Covariate (weighted) means for












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3: Speciﬁcation Tests for Models of Educational and Employment Outcomes
Wave 1 Wave 2
(Age 18) (Age 20)
DF P DF P
Dropping variables (across all six outcomes)
Dropping socioeconomic circumstances 58 0.06 0 8 0 .1
Dropping parental support 73 0.07 5 0 .0
Parameter restrictions (across all six outcomes)
Cores+Gift=Cores+Loan 15 0.01 5 0 .0
Cores+Loan=Cores+Nil 15 21.81 5 5 2 .8
Indpt+Gift=Indpt+Loan 15 0.01 5 3 8 .4
Indpt+Loan=Indpt+Nil 14 45.71 5 5 4 .8
Cores+Loan=Cores+Nil and Indpt+Loan=Indpt+Nil 29 28.73 0 5 8 .7
Cores+Gift=Cores+Loan and Cores+Loan=Cores+Nil 30 0.03 0 0 .0
Indpt+Gift=Indpt+Loan and Indpt+Loan=Indpt+Nil 29 0.03 0 0 .3
DF: degrees of freedom; P: p-value of likelihood ratio tests in percent; Cores: co-residing; Indpt: not
co-residing with parents; Gift, loan, nil: receiving ﬁnancial assistance in the form of gifts or loans,
or not receiving ﬁnancial assistance from parents. Source: Youth in Focus Survey data. Sample
restricted to respondents who are not in school and have nonmissing values for parental support,
youth outcomes, and all covariates. The general multinomial logit models have six categories of
educational and employment outcomes (all combinations of studying and full-time/part-time/no
work) and among the covariates six categories of parental support (all combinations of coresid-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5: Predicted Educational and Employment Outcomes
Wave 1 (age 18) Wave 2 (age 20)
Stdy FtW PtW NoW Stdy FtW PtW NoW
At observed covariates (a)
No disadv 69.53 1 .75 2 .51 5 .86 8 .83 4 .94 9 .91 5 .2
1.51 .51 .71 .41 .91 .92 .11 .4
Mod disadv 61.33 7 .14 1 .92 1 .05 8 .04 2 .83 9 .81 7 .4
1.31 .41 .41 .01 .62 .11 .91 .3
Ext disadv 48.83 3 .83 3 .13 3 .15 3 .53 9 .03 5 .72 5 .3
1.41 .41 .21 .31 .81 .71 .71 .6
At socioeconomic group means of all covariates (b)
No disadv 68.83 0 .95 6 .81 2 .36 7 .33 4 .25 1 .71 4 .1
1.91 .92 .11 .32 .62 .83 .02 .0
Mod disadv 58.23 8 .34 2 .01 9 .75 4 .24 6 .33 8 .31 5 .4
1.61 .61 .61 .12 .22 .72 .51 .4
Ext disadv 45.33 5 .03 3 .03 2 .05 0 .04 2 .53 4 .52 3 .0
2.01 .61 .51 .72 .62 .42 .51 .9
At socioeconomic group means of parental support, overall means of other covars (c)
No disadv 64.43 5 .45 1 .61 3 .06 0 .53 9 .34 4 .61 6 .1
2.32 .12 .21 .42 .93 .13 .22 .5
Mod disadv 58.43 7 .64 2 .61 9 .85 4 .94 5 .43 9 .21 5 .4
1.71 .61 .61 .12 .32 .72 .61 .5
Ext disadv 52.73 2 .73 8 .72 8 .65 9 .73 7 .54 3 .11 9 .3
2.02 .01 .91 .92 .72 .32 .72 .0
At overall means of parental support, socioeconomic group means of other covars
No disadv 69.53 2 .65 6 .41 1 .06 6 .03 6 .44 9 .81 3 .8
1.92 .02 .21 .32 .62 .93 .01 .9
Mod disadv 58.43 8 .04 2 .02 0 .05 4 .54 5 .83 8 .41 5 .8
1.61 .61 .61 .12 .22 .72 .61 .5
Ext disadv 45.73 5 .03 3 .33 1 .65 1 .54 1 .13 4 .82 4 .1
2.11 .71 .51 .72 .92 .72 .72 .1
At overall means of all covariates (d)
No disadv 65.53 7 .35 1 .41 1 .35 9 .24 1 .54 2 .81 5 .7
2.32 .22 .31 .42 .93 .03 .22 .4
Mod disadv 58.63 7 .34 2 .62 0 .15 5 .24 5 .03 9 .31 5 .8
1.71 .61 .61 .22 .32 .72 .61 .5
Ext disadv 53.03 2 .73 9 .02 8 .36 1 .13 6 .14 3 .62 0 .3
2.12 .01 .92 .02 .92 .42 .82 .1
Stdy: Studying (whether working or not); FtW, PtW, NoW: full-time, part-time, and no work
(whether studying or not); No, Mod, Ext disadv: no, moderate, and extensive socioeconomic disad-
vantage; covars: covariates. Standard errors in italics (nonparametric bootstrap with ﬁxed evaluation
points). Source: Youth in Focus Survey data. Sample restricted to respondents who are not in school
and have nonmissing values for parental support, youth outcomes and all covariates. Part-time work
includes respondents with unknown hours. Predictions based on multinomial logit models with six
categories of educational and employment outcomes (all combinations of studying and full-time/part-
time/no work) evaluated at weighted sample means, see Tables A1 and A4.